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Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 10-302
through 10-309 (1989) outline the
proper procedures for administering the Breathalyzer test and attempt to resolve questions as to its
admissibility. Id. at 1103-05. In
1986, the legislature amended section 10-309(a) to permit the introduction of a refusal to take the
Breathalyzer test into evidence at
trial, but left unchanged thatportion
ofthe statute which stated that a jury
could make no inferences or presumptions from that evidence concerning guilt or innocence. Id. at
1106-07. The court ofappeals interpreted the language of section 10309 to mean that evidence of a refusal to submitto a Breathalyzer test
could only be applied to collateral
matters that were not material or
relevant to the defendant's guilt or
innocence, such as whether the test
was properly administered. Id. at
1107.
The court of appeals noted that
Krauss clearly stated at trial that he
would not question whether he was
properly given the opportunity to
take the Breathalyzer test. Id. at
1107. Thus, the court found, ''there
was no collateral matter in question,
and there appeared no sound reason
for the State to introduce evidence
ofthe refusal except to influence the
jury toward a verdict of guilty." Id.
at 1107-08.
The court of appeals rejected the
state's argument that the admission
of the Breathalyzer test was harmless error. Id. at 1108. Although the
facts showed some evidence that
put Krauss's sobriety into doubt,
there was also conflicting evidence
showing that Krauss had sustained a
head injury. Id. The court stated
that it was the jury's function to
weigh the evidence. Id. at 1108.
The court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error in admitting the Breathalyzer

test in no way influenced the jury's
verdict. Id. (applying Dorsey v.
State. 350 A.2d 665, 679 (Md.
1976». Finally, the court ruled that
the trial judge's brief jury instructions did not overcome the prejudicial effect of admitting into evidence Krauss's refusal to take the
Breathalyzer test. Id.
Judge McAuliffe led the dissent
by arguing that section 10-309 was
properly drafted to avoid misapprehension and speculation on the part
of jurors. Id. at 1109. The dissent
suggested that the legislature wrote
section 10-309 to give the state an
opportunity to dispel any mistaken
belief among the jurors that the defendant had no right to refuse or was
not given the opportunity to take the
Breathalyzertest. The dissenttherefore believed that admitting the
defendant's refusal to take the test
would merely place the state on "a
level playing field." Id.
According to the decision in
Krauss, the state will no longer be
able to admit evidence that a drunk
driver refused to take a Breathalyzer
test, unless the driver first calls into
question the method by which the
test was administered. Only incases
where the defendant claims the police officer did not offer him the test
oritwasimproperlyperformedcould
the evidence of his refusal then be
admitted. The holding in Krauss
severely curtails the state's ability
to offer evidence that the defendant
refused a Breathalyzer test. Unless
the legislature decides to amend the
statute, the state has lost an important piece of trial evidence, tipping
the balance in favor of the de fendant, and, thereby resulting in fewer
drunk driving convictions.
- Karl Phillips

Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co.: STATUTE OFLIMITATIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO
RUN ON AN INSURED
MOTORIST'S CONTRACT
CLAIM UNTIL INSURER
DENIES COVERAGE.
In Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 582 A.2d 501 (Md. 1990), the
Court ofAppeals of Maryland found
that in a breach of contract action by
an insured motorist against his insurance carrier, the three-year statute oflimitations began to run when
the contract was actually breached
by the insurance company when it
denied coverage under the policy.
The holding rejected the view espoused by the court of special appeals in Yingling v. Phillips, 501
A.2d 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985),
that an insured's breach of contract
action accrued when the insured motorist first discovered that the
tortfeasor was uninsured.
Mr. and Mrs. William Lane were
involved in an auto accident when a
vehicle driven by Guy Callaway
tried to pass them on the left-hand
side of the road. As Callaway attempted to pass the Lanes, an oncoming vehicle, driven by Joseph
Warren and owned by Michael
McKenna, forced Callaway off the
road and hit the Lanes' vehicle. The
Lanes sustained permanent injuries
from the collision. At the time of
the accident, the Lanes had an automobile liability insurance policy with
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
(Nationwide). Nationwide was informed ofthe collision shortly after
it occurred.
In December of 1982, the Lanes
filed a tort action against Callaway,
Warren and McKenna, and notified
Nationwideofthependingsuit. Prior
to the filing of the tort action, the
Lanes discovered that neither Warren nor McKenna had automobile
insurance. The Lanes' attorney sent
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copies of the tort complaint to Nationwide, along with a letter duly
notifying Nationwide that McKenna
and Warren were uninsured motorists. Nationwide chose not to intervene in the suit.
The tort action was still pending
as of April 1986, when the Lanes
filed suit against Nationwide for
breach of contract. The suit alleged
that Nationwide breached its contract by failing to pay for the Lanes'
injuries pursuant to the uninsured
motorist provisions of the automobile liability insurance policy. Nationwide responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the suit was barred by the
three-year statute of limitations.
Nationwide asserted that limitations
began to run upon the Lanes' discovery that Warren and McKenna
were uninsured.
The circuit court agreed with Nationwide. The court of special appeals affirmed the decision, and further held that the statute of limitations began to run when Warren and
McKenna's status as uninsured
motorists was ascertained, regardless ofthe fact that the tort suit was
still pending when the contract suit
was filed. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to resolve the issue of when
the statute of limitations began to
run against the insurance carrier regarding its obligation to pay benefits in uninsured motorist actions.
The court of appeals first looked
to Maryland's Insurance Code. The
Code stated, in part, that all insurance policies for motor vehicles "issued, sold, or delivered in this State
. . . shall contain coverage . . . for
damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of such
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uninsured motor vehicle." Lane,
582 A.2d at 502-03 n.2 (quoting
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 541
(1986 & Supp. 1990». The court
stated that public policy required
insurance carriers to include
uninsured motorist provisions in
their policies so that "innocent victims ... who are unable to recover
from financially irresponsible
uninsured motorists" would be compensated. Lane, 582 A.2d at 503
(citations omitted).
The court of appeals noted that
the lower appellate court had relied
primarily upon its prior decision in
Yingling v. Phillips, 501 A.2d 87
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), where it
held that the insured's cause of action for recovery of uninsured motorist benefits accrued once the insured discovered the tortfeasor was
uninsured. Lane, 582 A.2d at 50304 (citing Yingling, 501 A.2d at 90).
Consequently, the court of special
appeals found that the statute of
limitations began to run at the same
time. Id.
When the court of special appeals erroneously asserted that the
statute of limitations began to run
upon the discovery that the
tortfeasors were uninsured, it essentially found that limitations began
to run in the contract action before
the contract was actually breached
by Nationwide. Id.582A.2dat503.
The court of appeals rejected this
conclusion because it was at odds
with general contract principles and
prior decisions. Id. (citing Reese v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 403
A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. 1979».
The Reese court construed
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute as providing that the insured
party had the option of deciding
whether to bring a tort or a contract
action with regard to uninsured
motorist compensation. Lane, 582
A.2d at 505. Therefore, if the in-

sured decided to first pursue an independent tort action against the
uninsured tortfeasor, he was not
seeking compensation under the insurance policy. In choosing not to
initially file an action in contract
against his own insurer, there was
no contract suit, and thus no breach
of contract. Id.
The court of appeals noted that
previous actions by insured motorists against their insurers for
uninsured motorist benefits have
been held to be contract actions.
Thus, general contract principles and
procedures governed. Id. at 503.
The court found that an insured
motorist had two options when
bringing a suit: the insured could
bring a contract action against his
own insurance company initially, or
he could bring a tort action directly
against the uninsured tortfeasor and
then pursue a contract action against
the uninsured motorist carrier. Id. at
503.
Thus, the insured motorist was
not required to request compensation for his loss under his insurance
policy; rather, he had the option of
first bringing a tort action. Id. at
505. Therefore, the court ofappeals
emphasized that the statute of limitations could not begin to run in a
contract action until compensation
was requested and subsequently
denied by the insurance carrier. Id.
In such a situation, the insurer is
protected via notification of the tort
action, thus giving it a chance to
intervene to protect its own interests. Id. at 505. If it were indeed
found that the statute of limitations
started to run upon the discovery
that the tortfeasor was uninsured,
then ''the insured's statutory option
of first bringing a tort suit against
the uninsured motorist, and thereafter making a claim under his
uninsured motorist endorsement,
[would] be frustrated." Id. at 506.

Accordingly, in Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., the Court of
Appeals of Maryland expressly
overruled Yingling v. Phillips, and
held that when the insured party
seeks to recover benefits from his
automobile liability insurance carrier (even if he has already timely
exercised his option to try to recover
damages in tort, having notified the
insurer of such an intent), the suit
against the insurer was governed by
traditional contract principles. As
such, the three-year statute of limitations did not begin to run against
the insured until the insurer breached
the contract by denying coverage of
the claim. Such a holding enables
an insured motorist to wait until the
carrier actually denies coverage before filing a contract suit. By placing the burden on the insurance carrier to make an affirmative denial,
the insured no longer takes the risk
that limitations might run merely
because he or she was aware the
other motorist was uninsured.
- Jennifer K. Etheridge

he acknowledged that he understood
them, Minnick refused to sign a
waiver of rights form. He agreed to
continue the interview but said he
would not answer"very many" questions. Id. at488. He then proceeded
to answer a number of questions
concerning his escape from a Mississippi jail and his subsequent flight.
He concluded the interview by saying, "[clome back Monday when I
have a lawyer," and that he would
make a more complete statement at
that time. Id. at 488. By Monday,
the accused had spoken with his
lawyer two or three times and been
told in no uncertain terms ''to talk to
nobody." Id. at 493.
On Monday morning, a deputy
sheriff from Mississippi came to the
California jail in order to question
Minnick. Having been told by his
jailers that he would "have to talk"
to the deputy and that he "could not
refuse," Minnick proceeded to confess his part in several murders committed following his escape. Id. at
488-89. Minnick confessed that he
and fellow prisoner, James Dyess,
Minnick v. Mississippi: RIGHT
broke into the victim's mobile home
TO COUNSEL DURING
after escaping from a county jail in
CUSTODIAL INTERROGAMississippi. When the victim reTION BARS POLICE INITIturned home, he was killed by Dyess.
ATED DISCUSSIONS UNLESS Minnick was then handed a pistol
COUNSEL IS PRESENT.
and ordered at gunpoint to shoot the
In Minnickv. Mississippi, IllS. victim's friend. He did.
Ct. 486 (1990), the United States
The motion to suppress these
Supreme Court reversed the Missis- statements, as given to the Mississippi Supreme Court when it ruled sippi deputy, was denied. Minnick
that when a defendant in custody was convicted on two counts of
has requested counsel, officials may capital murder and sentenced to
not reinitiate interrogation without death. On appeal, the Supreme Court
counsel present. This holds true of Mississippi upheld the trial court
even if the accused has consulted ruling that the defendant's Fifth
with his attorney since making the Amendment right to counsel had
request.
been satisfied. The United States
Robert Minnick was arrested in Supreme Court granted certiorari to
1986 in California on a Mississippi examine whether the defendant's
warrant for capital murder. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel
next day, two FBI agents re-read had been terminated or merely sushim his Miranda rights. Although pended by his previous consulta-

tions with counsel.
Justice Kennedy began the analysis by examining the language of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), where the Court held that
police must terminate their interrogation ofan accused in custody when
the accused requests counsel. At
that point, ''the individual must have
an opportunity to confer with the
attorney and to have him present
during any subsequent questioning."
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489 (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). Turning
to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981), the Court determined
that having requested an attorney,
an accused "is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id. at
490 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at
484-85). This legal precedent left
open the possibility of a defendant
impliedly asking for counsel at each
and every new custodial interrogation. The issue posed in Minnick,
therefore, was whether the Edwards
requirement of counsel at custodial
interrogations was satisfied after the
suspect had consulted with an attorney.
In support of allowing
uncounseled confessions, the Supreme Court of Mississippi had
rested its holding on the theory that
the Fifth Amendment requirement
dissipated once the accused met with
counsel and could only be reinstated
by another request for counsel.
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 490. The
Supreme Court, however, refused
to follow this proposition for three
reasons. First, a holding that allowed the Fifth Amendment rightto
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